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Chapter 13
Epistemic Paternalism, Epistemic 
Permissivism, and  
Standpoint Epistemology 
Liz Jackson
In most US states, it’s illegal to drive without wearing one’s seatbelt. Many 
recreational drugs are outlawed, even if used alone on one’s own property. 
I enforce a strict no-technology policy for students in my classes. A public 
beach may disallow swimming without the presence of a lifeguard. These 
are all examples of paternalism, the practice of limiting the free choices of 
agents, without their consent, for the sake of promoting their best interests. 
Paternalism is frequently discussed in legal, ethical, and social contexts.1
A practice that has received less attention, however, is a strand of paternal-
ism in the epistemic realm.2 So-called epistemic paternalism is the practice 
of (i) interfering with someone’s inquiry, (ii) without their consent, (iii) and 
for their own epistemic good.3 Conditions (i) and (iii) are unique to epistemic 
paternalism: you can engage in paternalism without interfering with some-
one’s inquiry, and without having a distinctly epistemic motivation for doing 
so, as in many of the opening examples. Nonetheless, epistemic paternalism 
is a strand of general paternalism.
In this chapter, I concern myself with the question of whether epistemic 
paternalism is epistemically justified. First, I discuss the definition of epis-
temic paternalism is more detail and clarify this question about its justifi-
cation. Then, I explore how two recent epistemological theses—epistemic 
permissivism and standpoint epistemology—answer this question. I argue 
they provide a sufficient condition for unjustified epistemic paternalism. Fur-
ther, I note some remarkable parallels between epistemic permissivism and 
standpoint epistemology. I conclude that epistemic paternalism is unjustified 
in a certain class of cases, and, in general, we ought to exercise caution before 
engaging in epistemically paternalistic practices.
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DEFINING EPISTEMIC PATERNALISM
Recall our definition:
Epistemic Paternalism: the practice of
  (i) interfering with someone’s inquiry,
 (ii) without their consent, and
(iii) for their own epistemic good.
Let’s consider each condition in more detail. Condition (i) refers to inter-
fering with inquiry. I take inquiry to include both evidence-gathering and 
belief-forming practices. A common example of interference involves with-
holding evidence. For instance, juries aren’t allowed to consider certain kinds 
of evidence because it is considered “inadmissible,” for example, evidence 
of a suspect’s past crimes. If evidence is inadmissible or the jury is unlikely 
to weigh it properly, it is withheld, even though it is relevant—in the sense 
that, if properly weighed, it could make the jury’s final verdict more accu-
rate.4 Another example of withholding evidence involves a professor who 
doesn’t give her class an argument for moral relativism, knowing many of her 
students have relativist tendencies. Giving them this argument would likely 
reinforce those, and it might be epistemically better for them to instead see 
reasons why moral relativism is problematic.
One can also interfere with another’s inquiry by manipulating the way they 
interpret or weigh their evidence. This enables one to influence another’s 
beliefs without changing their evidence (or, in some cases, their evidence that 
bears on the target proposition). So, for example, if you are deciding which 
hypothesis best explains the evidence, I might make a particular hypothesis 
salient and not mention other possible explanations, to bias you toward my 
preferred explanation of the evidence. Or, when teaching, I might give the 
class a philosophical argument for p, but then strongly emphasize simplicity 
while purposefully leaving out discussion of the value of explanatory power. 
This could influence the students’ conclusion about p without influencing 
their evidence that bears on p. Generally, then, one can engage in epistemic 
paternalism without attempting to change another’s evidence.5
Condition (ii) is the non-consent condition, which is the same in both gen-
eral and epistemic paternalism. This condition is relatively straightforward: 
one engages in the practice without consulting with the inquiring party. Alter-
natively, one might interfere explicitly against another’s will.
Condition (iii) involves the motivation for epistemic paternalism—that 
is, for the inquirer’s own epistemic good.6 This raises the question: What is 
epistemically good? In the epistemic paternalism literature thus far, there has 
been a strong emphasis on true belief.7 However, this emphasis strikes me 
as relatively narrow when considering the myriad of things epistemologists 
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value (see DePaul 2001). For one, rational or justified beliefs, even if false, 
intuitively carry some epistemic value. In fact, Feldman (2000: 686) claims 
there is nothing epistemically valuable about true, unjustified beliefs. This 
is a strong claim. We can settle for a weaker one: epistemic justification 
confers epistemic value to beliefs, even to false beliefs (consider: a justi-
fied false belief seems epistemically better than an unjustified false belief ). 
Thus, a potential motivation for epistemic paternalism involves increasing an 
inquirer’s rational/justified beliefs.
JUSTIFYING EPISTEMIC PATERNALISM
Upon understanding the nature of epistemic paternalism, it is natural to turn 
next to normative questions. This paper concerns the question that is the 
original focus of Goldman’s (1991) paper: Is epistemic paternalism epis-
temically justified? Note that this question is about the epistemic justifica-
tion of a particular practice, namely, interfering with inquiry. In this sense, 
“epistemic justification” (or “epistemically justified”) is used in a somewhat 
non-standard way—it doesn’t pick out the thing that turns true unGettiered 
belief into knowledge.8 Here, “justification” indicates when a practice, on 
balance, promotes epistemic goods. This explains why most authors in the 
epistemic paternalism literature either implicitly or explicitly adopt a version 
of epistemic consequentialism.
Further, this question controversially assumes that epistemic norms can 
guide action.9 However, it is reasonable to think some epistemic norms guide 
certain kinds of behaviors, such as how we get evidence (e.g., inquiry and 
evidence gathering) and what we do with our evidence (e.g., critical reason-
ing and reflection on our evidence).10
There are a variety of answers to the question of whether epistemic pater-
nalism is epistemically justified. Consider the following options:
A1. Epistemic paternalism is always epistemically justified.
A2. Epistemic paternalism is never epistemically justified.
A3. Epistemic paternalism is always epistemically justified in ABC circumstances.
A4. Epistemic paternalism is never epistemically justified in XYZ circumstances.
A1 and A2 are hard to establish, especially against a backdrop of epis-
temic consequentialism. Given consequentialism, whether epistemic pater-
nalism is justified depends on relevant outcomes. Nonetheless, this doesn’t 
prevent us from giving an answer like A3 or A4—as others have already 
done. Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a), for instance, gives an answer in the form of 
A3; he provides two jointly sufficient conditions for justified epistemic 
paternalism.11
16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd   203 2/21/2020   10:23:44 AM
204 Chapter 13
Here, I invoke a similar strategy, but unlike Ahlstrom-Vij, my answer 
is in the form of A4. I will argue that two recent theses in epistemology— 
epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology—provide us with a 
class of cases in which epistemic paternalism is unjustified. This doesn’t 
amount to an answer as strong as A2, but it does give us reason to be cau-
tious before engaging in an epistemically paternalistic practice and consider 
whether our situation might fall into that class of cases.
To sum up what we’ve covered so far, epistemic paternalism is the prac-
tice of interfering with someone’s inquiry without their consent for their own 
epistemic good. I’ve focused on the question of whether epistemic paternal-
ism is epistemically justified, and will argue that when a certain set of condi-
tions are met, it is unjustified. With this background in place, I now turn to 
epistemic permissivism.
EPISTEMIC PERMISSIVISM
Epistemic permissivism is a thesis about epistemic rationality and evidence. 
Specifically, it is the view that there are evidential situations that rationally 
permit more than one attitude toward a proposition.12 Here, epistemic ratio-
nality involves responding to one’s epistemic situation appropriately, and 
it seems like certain evidential situations allow for multiple appropriate 
responses. For instance, paleontologists might share evidence but disagree 
about what killed the dinosaurs (Rosen 2001). Peter van Inwagen and David 
Lewis might share evidence but disagree about the nature of free will (van 
Inwagen 1996). Here, I will focus on a relatively weak version of permis-
sivism called interpersonal permissivism: the view that there are evidential 
situations in which two (or more) agents can rationally adopt more than one 
doxastic attitude toward a proposition.
Interpersonal permissivism is commonly motivated by the idea that agents 
have differing epistemic standards (Schoenfield 2014). Epistemic standards 
are the means by which we evaluate, weigh, interpret, and process evidence. 
For instance, we might share evidence but rationally disagree about what 
hypothesis best explains the evidence. Or consider the two Jamesian epis-
temic goals: believe truth and avoid error. If I emphasize the value of believ-
ing truth, I may believe p with only a little evidence for p. If you emphasize 
the value of avoiding error, you might require significantly more evidence 
before you believe p. It doesn’t seem like a particular weighing of these two 
goals is rationally required (Kelly 2013).13
What does any of this have to do with epistemic paternalism? Consider 
a natural reason one might engage in an epistemically paternalistic prac-
tice. I might think that my evidence E supports a particular proposition p. 
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However, I might suspect that another person, upon learning E, won’t come 
to believe p—in fact, they might even come to believe not-p. On this basis, 
I withhold E from them. However, if interpersonal permissivism is true, then 
the fact that someone with my evidence would come to a different conclusion 
than me doesn’t mean their belief is irrational or that they’ve misinterpreted 
the evidence. The possibility of permissive cases then undermines a reason 
that one might act paternalistically.
A specific example might make this point more concrete. A frequent case 
used in both the permissivism literature and the epistemic paternalism litera-
ture involves juries. Consider a judge who is deciding whether to act pater-
nalistically by withholding some evidence from a jury. She is considering 
doing so because they would interpret evidence in a way that, to him or her, 
seems misguided. She suspects that, if she gave them the extra evidence, they 
would think it supports p, when she is convinced it supports not-p.14 In a lot 
of these cases, what seems misguided to her might just be another epistemi-
cally legitimate way of interpreting the evidence. The jurors might invoke a 
different epistemic standard when weighing and interpreting the evidence—a 
standard that is epistemically acceptable, but results in a different conclusion 
about who is guilty (they may, for instance, conclude that another hypothesis 
best explains the evidence).
Of course, sometimes one might invoke an epistemic standard that is 
unlikely to produce rational beliefs. For instance, a jury might be disposed 
to make a basic math error or engage in a process of reasoning that is prob-
lematically biased. In these cases, the justification for epistemic paternalism 
is clear. However, these are also not cases of epistemic permissivism, as the 
jury is not invoking an epistemically legitimate standard, so the beliefs pro-
duced using that standard are not rational. The permissivist does not claim 
that any epistemic standard goes—merely that there are different but equally 
legitimate standards that can be applied to a body of evidence.
The possibility of interpersonal permissivism doesn’t merely have implica-
tions for the practice of withholding evidence; it also speaks against interfer-
ing with the way another interprets or processes evidence. Consider again our 
judge who worries that some members of the jury would come to a different 
conclusion than she. Assuming they share evidence and are in an interperson-
ally permissive case, the fact that the jury would disagree with her does not 
give her grounds to interfere with the way they process the evidence.
Not only does interference in permissive cases fail to have epistemically 
good effects; it also can have epistemically bad effects. Interfering may stifle 
the jury’s ability to think creatively and inquire freely. They might consider 
possible explanations of the evidence that had never occurred to the judge; for 
example, the judge might be convinced that Smith did it, but the jury might 
employ another standard that makes salient the possibility that Jones, Smith’s 
16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd   205 2/21/2020   10:23:44 AM
206 Chapter 13
butler did it (Douven 2009). Both beliefs are rational, given the evidence, 
but if the judge had paternalistically imposed her epistemic standard on the 
jurors, the latter explanation may never have been considered. Co-existing 
epistemic standards lead to epistemic diversity that improves our collective 
epistemic position in the long run. For this reason, in permissive cases, not 
only is there no clear justification for paternalism, but there is positive reason 
not to engage in a paternalistic practice. Interfering with another’s epistemic 
standard will often have long-term negative epistemic effects, and in permis-
sive cases, is epistemically unjustified.
It is worth noting that certain defenders of epistemic paternalism may agree 
with this conclusion. For example, Ahlstrom-Vij argues that for paternalism to 
be justified, the one interfering needs to have good reason to believe that their 
interference is epistemically pareto efficient: it will make no one epistemi-
cally worse off and at least one person epistemically better off.15 Given that 
 Ahlstrom-Vij and I are both merely arguing for sufficient conditions for justi-
fied and unjustified epistemic paternalism, respectively, it isn’t surprising that 
our arguments aren’t strictly inconsistent. My argument, however, provides 
reason to think that certain interferences that seem epistemically pareto effi-
cient may not be—interpreting the evidence well and concluding p doesn’t pro-
vide ground to interfere with another because they conclude not-p. Thus, even 
if Ahlstrom-Vij’s conditional claim is correct, my argument narrows the range 
of cases in which it applies—the pareto condition isn’t met in permissive cases.
I have been arguing that in permissive cases, epistemic paternalism is not 
epistemically permitted. One might worry that epistemic permissivism con-
cerns epistemic rationality—but rationality doesn’t guarantee truth. Permis-
sivism wouldn’t speak to epistemic paternalism concerned with promoting 
true beliefs, rather than rational ones. I could be in a permissive case and 
acknowledge that another’s beliefs are perfectly rational, but act paternalisti-
cally for the sake of promoting true beliefs.
In response, the problem here is that from the perspective of the agents in 
the permissive case, the evidence does not make the truth obvious. Some have 
likened permissive cases to cases of underdetermination in science (Jack-
son & Turnbull forthcoming)—in these cases, the evidence underdetermines 
what one ought to conclude. When I find myself in a permissive case, I’m 
not in a position to know whether my paternalistic action would be alethically 
valuable for another. Thus, permissivism also undermines the alethic justifi-
cation for epistemic paternalism.
In this, my claims about the permissibility of permissivism take the agent’s 
perspective seriously. This raises the question: Does one have to know they 
are in a permissive case? Suppose one is in a permissive case but they have 
no idea; is paternalism unjustified for them?16 In response, while the sim-
plest case in one in which agents know or justifiedly believe their case is 
AuQ90
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permissive, the applicability of my argument goes beyond these straightfor-
ward cases. If the probability that the case is permissive is high enough, then 
the expected epistemic utility of the interference often won’t be justified on 
balance (depending on the expected gains and losses of the interference).
Generally, many disagreements are pervasive, and open-mindedness is 
difficult to cultivate. It is hard to see when someone who disagrees with 
you is employing another, equally legitimate epistemic standard, as this 
often requires epistemic empathy that involves “taking on” their perspective. 
Because this can be so challenging, I worry that there are cases where one 
might think one is engaging in legitimate epistemic paternalism—helping out 
another epistemically. However, one is instead ruling out another adequate 
way of interpreting the evidence. And this could have long-term bad effects—
for example, stifling new ideas and free inquiry. Thus, we have reason to 
exercise caution and consider whether we might be in an epistemically per-
missive case before engaging in epistemic paternalism.
Of course, some deny that permissive cases ever occur.17 While I’ve moti-
vated interpersonal permissivism with epistemic standards, the permissivism 
debate is complex and has a growing literature, and I cannot fully settle it 
here. If one were convinced permissive cases are impossible, then this argu-
ment won’t have purchase for them (although they need a response to the 
argument for permissivism from epistemic standards).
Also note that there is a distinction between moderate and extreme permis-
sivism. Extreme permissivists maintain that there are evidential situations in 
which all doxastic attitudes toward a proposition are permitted (e.g., belief, 
withholding, and disbelief; all credences between [0,1]). Moderate permissiv-
ists maintain merely that there are evidential situations in which a subset of 
those doxastic attitudes is permitted (e.g., only belief and withholding; only 
credences between [0.9, 0.7]).18 In moderately permissive cases, it may be 
justified to engage in paternalism to move others away from the impermis-
sible attitudes. For example, if you and I are in an evidential situation that 
permits belief in p and withholding on p, but not disbelief, I may be justified 
in paternalistically nudging you away from disbelief.19 Nonetheless, paternal-
ism is unjustified when it draws others away from the permitted attitudes.
My main claim is as follows:
Strong claim: If, given their evidence and a proposition p, agents are in an 
epistemically permissive case with respect to attitudes A1-An in p, it is always 
epistemically wrong for any of them to paternalistically interfere to change the 
other’s attitude A1-An in p.
I’ve provided several reasons to think this claim is true. However, the 
assumption of epistemic consequentialism makes it challenging to establish 
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in a short chapter. It requires that, in the permissive cases described, there is 
no epistemic good (even in the long run) that outweighs the losses associ-
ated with interfering with another’s inquiry. I’ve tried to explain earlier why 
I think there are serious losses associated with this kind of interference, and 
also why other possible epistemic goods (e.g., true beliefs) won’t outweigh 
these losses in permissive cases. I realize, though, that all might not be con-
vinced. In this case, there are two weaker claims to fall back on:
Weak claim 1: If, given their evidence and a proposition p, agents are in an 
epistemically permissive case with respect to attitudes A1-An in p, then 
a potential justification they might have for interfering with each other’s 
inquiry is undermined.
Weak claim 2: If, given their evidence and a proposition p, agents are in an 
epistemically permissive case with respect to attitudes A1-An in p, it is 
often epistemically wrong for any of them to paternalistically interfere to 
change the other’s attitude A1-An in p.
Note that the first weak claim asserts that permissivism simply undermines 
a potential positive justification for paternalism but doesn’t necessarily claim 
we have positive reason not to do it. The difference between the second weak 
claim and the strong claim is the scope of the cases involved. I hope I’ve at 
least convinced the reader of these claims.
Generally, then, the possibility of permissive cases undermines a justifica-
tion for epistemic paternalism, and renders epistemic paternalism unjustified, 
at least in most permissive cases. Now, I turn to another epistemological the-
sis that also speaks against a class of paternalistic interferences—standpoint 
epistemology.
STANDPOINT EPISTEMOLOGY
Standpoint epistemology comes in many forms.20 Here, I focus on a general 
version that states that one’s social position affects the epistemic goods that 
one can access. More precisely, standpoint epistemology is the view that 
one’s social situation gives one unique access to epistemic goods (such as 
information/evidence, concepts, ways of interpreting or weighing evidence, 
etc.) that people in other social situations cannot access.21 In other words, 
two different people can come to very different conclusions about the same 
matter, either because they end up having different evidence, or because they 
end up interpreting or weighing evidence quite differently. Standpoint episte-
mologists argue that one’s social situation affects both what one in fact knows 
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(or rationally believes), but also what is knowable (or rationally believable) 
for them. There are two versions of this thesis:
Global standpoint epistemology: one’s social situation affects all of their 
(epistemically) rational beliefs/knowledge.
Local standpoint epistemology: one’s social situation affects some of their 
(epistemically) rational beliefs/knowledge.
I sense that most standpoint epistemologists endorse the local thesis, 
rather than the global one.22 For example, one’s gender might not affect their 
beliefs about the weather tomorrow, but it may affect their views on divorce, 
abortion, or labor economics. The local thesis also helps with the worry that 
standpoint epistemology leads to a problematic global subjectivism, an objec-
tion that has been discussed extensively, especially in terms of implications 
for scientific objectivity and progress.23 Thus, I will focus on the local thesis.
Standpoint epistemology has been linked to various other epistemologi-
cal theses; for instance, Toole (forthcoming) likens it to pragmatic or moral 
encroachment, as she focuses on how non-epistemic social facts can affect 
knowledge. At the same time, it appears to have quite a bit in common with 
epistemic permissivism, especially the interpersonal strand of permissivism 
discussed earlier.24 One’s social situation can affect, shape, and potentially 
even partially constitute one’s epistemic standard, and thus the way one 
weighs and processes evidence. In fact, standpoints and epistemic standards 
might be two ways of describing the same phenomenon. Two people may 
share evidence, but due to their distinct social situations, process that evi-
dence very differently and come to incompatible conclusions. In the same 
way, there isn’t always a unique most-rational standpoint, there isn’t a unique 
most-rational standard. Thus, it seems natural for advocates of standpoint 
epistemology to adopt a permissivist epistemology; similarly, advocates of 
intrapersonal permissivism might find themselves sympathetic to standpoint 
epistemology.
Given that standpoint epistemology and interpersonal permissivism have 
some notable similarities, it makes sense that standpoint epistemology would 
also render epistemic paternalism unjustified, at least on the matters affected 
by the standpoint. The basic idea is this: A might consider acting paternalisti-
cally (e.g., withholding evidence from B or interfering with the way B pro-
cesses evidence) because B would come to a completely different conclusion 
if B had that evidence or processed that evidence according to B’s standpoint. 
However, if both standpoints are epistemically legitimate ways of interpret-
ing evidence, then A can’t justify paternalism because B would have more 
rational beliefs if A interfered. Further, because in most of these cases, A also 
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won’t have access to the truth of the matter, the interference can’t be veritisti-
cally justified either. And again, the interference will often lead to epistemi-
cally bad results—stifling distinct perspectives and the values associated with 
epistemic diversity. So, there are epistemic negatives associated with interfer-
ing, and epistemic positives associated with not-interfering. Thus, standpoint 
epistemology also renders epistemic paternalism unjustified.
Here is a way to see my overall argument in this section. Standpoint epis-
temology is closely related to interpersonal permissivism. We’ve already 
seen that epistemic paternalism is unjustified in permissive cases. Thus, the 
same considerations apply to situations where one’s standpoint affects one’s 
epistemic attitudes.
One might object that it is possible to endorse standpoint epistemology but 
deny permissivism. Maybe a standpoint has a single purpose, that is., chang-
ing what evidence one has, and two people with different standpoints will 
always have different evidence. My response is twofold. First, on this view, 
one’s standpoint has a relatively limited function; all it does is affect is what 
evidence one has. There is a reason to think that this is not the only function 
of the standpoint. A natural alternative picture is a permissivist standpoint 
epistemology, on which the standpoint also affects the way one weighs or 
processes evidence—especially given the apparent similarities between 
standpoints and epistemic standards.
A second reply is that standpoint epistemology might, on its own, render 
epistemic paternalism unjustified, whether or not permissivism is true. For 
example, there might be something epistemically valuable about the fact 
that different standpoints provide different bodies of evidence. Consider the 
literature on the cognitive division of labor, which supports the idea that 
researchers pursing a large variety of different projects is long-term epistemi-
cally best. This diversity is valuable even if, from our current perspective, 
some of those projects have a low probability of success (or the hypotheses 
they are testing have a low prior probability; see Kitcher 1990, 1993). The 
epistemic value of diverse perspectives is emphasized in this literature. Mul-
doon (2013: 123–124) summarizes, “In several of the models of the division 
of cognitive labor . . . diversity plays an important and positive role . . . it 
encourages differences in agents, and as more diversity is generated, we can 
make a finer-grained division of labor.” Epistemic diversity—including the 
diversity of various standpoints—leads to breakthroughs in the context of 
collective inquiry, and paternalistically interfering with others to promote a 
monistic way of thinking stifles this. This speaks against interfering with the 
inquiry of people with other standpoints, whether or not permissivism is true.
Second, one might object that standpoint epistemology is disanalogous to 
permissivism because standpoint epistemology privileges certain standpoints. 
For instance, many standpoint epistemologists would claim that the female 
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standpoint should be privileged over, not merely considered alongside of, 
the male standpoint when it comes to questions like abortion.25 In response, 
this is analogous to the way permissivists view epistemic standards, since 
permissivists don’t maintain that any epistemic standard produces rational 
beliefs. Their view is not that that any standard goes. At the same time, both 
permissivists and standpoint theorists posit that there are multiple, equally 
epistemically good standpoints; even if the female standpoint should some-
times be privileged over the male standpoint, we also shouldn’t assume all 
women have the same standpoint—not all women agree on whether and when 
abortion is morally permitted, for instance. As Bowell (2019: sec. 7a) says, 
“Feminist standpoint theories can also be misunderstood as proposing a sin-
gle, monolithic feminist standpoint . . . [but they] are clearly not committed 
to the project of formulating a homogenous women’s or feminist standpoint.” 
Thus, on both views, certain viewpoints are privileged, but multiple equally 
good viewpoints sometimes arrive at competing verdicts.
CONCLUSION
On many epistemic theories, such as permissivism and standpoint theory, 
there isn’t one privileged way of interpreting a body of evidence. I’ve pointed 
out that this shared commitment highlights a noteworthy connection between 
standpoint epistemology and epistemic permissivism, and suggested that 
prominent versions of standpoint epistemology have much in common with 
interpersonal permissivism.
I’ve also argued that this points us to a class of cases in which epistemic 
paternalism is epistemically unjustified. We might be quite confident that we 
are doing someone an epistemic favor, when in reality, we are imposing our 
own standards on them. In these cases, epistemic paternalism can have bad 
long-term consequences: squelching valuable perspectives and promoting a 
monistic way of thinking. Thus, we ought to exercise caution before engaging 
in epistemically paternalistic practices, and consider whether we might be in 
a permissive case or imposing our standpoint on another.26
NOTES
 1. For philosophical discussions of paternalism, see Mill (1869), Dworkin (2010), 
Grill and Hanna (2018).
 2. Discussions of epistemic paternalism include Goldman (1991), Ahlstrom-Vij 
(2013a, 2013b), Pritchard (2013), Ridder (2013), Bullock (2018), and Croce (2018).
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16028-0338d-1pass-r01.indd   211 2/21/2020   10:23:45 AM
212 Chapter 13
 4. This example features prominently in Goldman (1991). However, it is unclear 
that withholding information from a jury counts as epistemic paternalism in many 
real-life cases, since, upon agreeing to be on a jury, one should realize that evidence 
might be withheld from them, due to the relevant laws about inadmissible evidence in 
courtrooms. Thus, it is plausible that, upon agreeing to be a juror, one is consenting 
to have evidence withheld from them. Thanks to Kirk Lougheed.
 5. See Jackson (forthcoming-a) and Jackson and Turnbull (forthcoming) for 
further discussion of the ways that one’s broader epistemic situation can affect one’s 
beliefs without affecting one’s evidence.
 6. This raises the question: Does an action count as epistemic paternalism if it is 
done partially for one’s epistemic good and partially for their moral and/or practical 
good? This question deserves more attention but goes beyond the scope of this chap-
ter; see Bullock (2018: 443) and Jackson (forthcoming-b) for discussion. Thanks to 
Seth Lazar.
 7. See, for example, Goldman (1991) and Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a). Pritchard 
(2013) discusses ways that epistemic paternalism might promote both true beliefs and 
understanding.
 8. Thanks to Pamela Robinson.
 9. Feldman (2000) Kelly (2002: fn. 30), and Berker (2018) argue that there aren’t 
epistemic reasons for action.
 10. See Tidman (1996), Hookway (1999), Friedman (2019), and Jackson 
(forthcoming-b).
 11. See Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a: 134). For a criticism of his account, see Bullock 
(2018: 440–442).
 12. Defenses of epistemic permissivism include Kelly (2013), Meacham (2014), 
Meacham (2019), Schoenfield (2014), Schoenfield (forthcoming), and Jackson 
(forthcoming-a).
 13. For further examples of ways epistemic standards might differ, see Nolan 
(2014) and Meacham (2014).
 14. There is a question of how often judges employ this sort of reasoning to justify 
paternalism in real life. In the United States, for instance, the withholding of infor-
mation is often formal and procedural, for example, juries cannot see a defendant’s 
criminal record. I don’t want to rule out the possibility, however, that judges also 
withhold information for non-procedural reasons, for example, because from their 
point of view, it will mislead the jury. Further, my points can be applied to many 
cases that don’t involve courtrooms; the courtroom case is merely to illustrate a more 
general point. Thanks to Guy Axtell. (See also note 4).
 15. See Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a: 134). Thanks to Amiel Bernal.
 16. Thanks to Justin D’Ambrosio.
 17. White (2005), Matheson (2011), White (2013), Greco (2016), Horowitz 
(2019), and Stapleford (2019).
 18. This distinction is found in White (2005). For a defense of moderate permis-
sivism, see Roeber (forthcoming); for an argument against moderate permissivism, 
see Horowitz (2014).
 19. Thanks to Klaas Kray.
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 20. Standpoint epistemology was developed from Marxist epistemology by Smith 
(1974), Hartsock (1983), Rose (1983), and Harding (1986). For recent discussions, 
see Wylie (2003), Kukla (2006), Solomon (2009), and Toole (forthcoming). See also 
the 2009 (vol. 24, no. 4) symposium on standpoint theory in Hypatia, introduced and 
summarized by Crasnow (2009).
 21. Many standpoint epistemologists affirm several additional claims, for exam-
ple, (a) that these epistemic goods are not merely passively received, but are often 
actively sought after and constitute an achievement, (b) that there is unique epistemic 
advantage associated with powerlessness, and, a normative claim, (c) that we ought to 
embrace the valuable contributions to knowledge that differing standpoints provide.
 22. Solomon (2009) and Toole (forthcoming).
 23. See especially Crasnow (2013) but also Harding (1986), Harding (1993), and 
Kourany (2009).
 24. Thanks to Janine Jones. An interesting area for further research is whether 
standpoint epistemology could also be linked with diachronic intrapersonal permis-
sivism, if one’s standpoint/epistemic standard changed over time.
 25. Thanks to Justin D’Ambrosio.
 26. Acknowledgments: Thanks to Amiel Bernal, Guy Axtell, Seth Lazar, Justin 
D’Ambrosio, Nic Southwood, Matthew Kopec, Kirk Lougheed, Klaas Kray, Chris 
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